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Submission on the Electricity Sector Market Transformation Position Paper, 2026
Government Notice No. 7841, Government Gazette No. 55226, 21 August 2026
By the
Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation (NPC)
28 October 2026
The Freedom Foundation & Izwe Lami is a policy think tank which researches and analyses government policy and positions in the national interest. It has no political affiliations or allegiances.
The energy sector is perhaps the most critical South African sector as it supports and affects every individual’s life and determines the economic prospects of the country for than any other single factor.
We have brought together several experts who provide valuable insight to energy market transformation in addition to making our internal submission from CEO Leon Louw.
Contents
Submission Details
To: The Director-General, Department of Electricity and Energy, for the attention of Ms Vusani Ramuntshi. By email to EMTPP.Queries@dee.gov.za.
From: Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation (NPC), Reg. No. 2023/726599/08, PBO No. 930083077. Unit 12, Valle Verde, 8 Riley Road, Bedfordview, Germiston 2007, Johannesburg, South Africa. Telephone +27 67 401 8589. Email info@freedomfoundation.co.za. Contact person: Leon Louw, Chief Executive Officer.
Closing date. This submission is made within the period for comment as extended to 28 October 2026 by Government Notice No. 7948 (Government Gazette No. 55436 of 22 September 2026).
Related submission. We have also commented on the Revised Electricity Pricing Policy, 2026 (Government Notice No. 7852). The two submissions should be read together.
Willingness to engage. We would welcome the opportunity to make oral representations.
Summary
The shackled runner. The Position Paper fires the starting gun for a competitive electricity market. But it keeps one runner shackled. Eskom — the largest participant, the owner of most of the country's generation and of its grid — is to compete while its retail prices remain regulated, its competitors' prices are free, its transmission network is removed from its ownership, and its Board remains subject to political direction. A race in which one runner is shackled is not a competition. It is a handicap.
Market liberation requires Eskom liberation. We support the Paper's core direction: competitive generation, a voluntary trading platform, bilateral contracts and private retail supply free of price regulation. But market liberalisation without Eskom liberalisation is unfair, contrary to the national interest and, in important respects, arguably unlawful. Eskom should be freed from price control, from municipal debt, from non-commercial obligations and from political interference, so that it can compete on equal terms.
Contestability, not central design. The Paper should rely on free entry and free contracting, which make markets contestable, rather than on centrally designed mechanisms such as a capacity market, phased and gatekept market opening, and asymmetric price regulation. Where entry is free, price control is unnecessary and harmful.
Legality. The Paper envisages that the National Transmission Company of South Africa (NTCSA), which owns and operates the transmission network within the Eskom group, will be "converted into an independent entity within five years", and that Eskom Generation and Eskom Distribution will be further unbundled from Eskom Holdings. Reports indicate that Government has appointed or sought a transaction adviser and regards the separation as final. Removing the transmission business from Eskom rests on questionable legal foundations. The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act, 2024 provides for the TSO's functions but not, in our reading, for the transfer of Eskom's transmission assets. Eskom's directors are bound by the Companies Act and the Public Finance Management Act to act in Eskom's best interests and to protect its assets, and may not lawfully give away a major asset without value. The shareholder may not manage the company. A decision treated as final before public comment is considered is not a genuine consultation.
Our principal recommendations. We recommend that the Department:
open the wholesale market to all participants immediately, rather than soft-launching it within the Eskom group and phasing others in from 2027;
abandon the proposed capacity market in favour of bilateral contracting and voluntary reserve arrangements;
free Eskom's retail and wholesale prices on the same terms as its competitors', and confine price regulation to genuinely uncontested network services;
leave the ownership of transmission assets to Eskom's Board, acting in Eskom's interests, and secure the TSO's independence through operational separation, open access and transparency rather than divestiture;
where any transfer of assets is nonetheless pursued, effect it only under clear statutory authority, with the shareholder approvals the Companies Act and the PFMA require, and with fair value paid to Eskom for the protection of its creditors;
make clear that the separation of the NTCSA from Eskom remains open to public comment, and genuinely consider that comment; and
relieve Eskom of municipal debt, sub-economic legacy liabilities and social obligations, funding social support openly from the Budget.
About the Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation
The Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation is a non-profit public benefit organisation that promotes economic freedom, the rule of law and limited government as the surest routes to prosperity for all South Africans. Its Chief Executive, Leon Louw, is the founder and former chief executive of the Free Market Foundation.
The Foundation has recently completed an Electricity Policy Review (October 2026), which examines Eskom's restructuring, transmission ownership, market liberalisation, contestability, fiduciary obligations and governance. This submission draws on that Review.
What We Support
Competitive generation. We welcome the commitment that generation will be competitive and that private producers may compete against Eskom.
Voluntary trading and bilateral contracts. We welcome the proposal that use of the central trading platform will be voluntary and that bilateral contracts will be permitted. These are the foundations of a contestable market: buyers and sellers are free to transact on terms they choose, and no one is compelled to use a single exchange.
Private retail supply free of price regulation. We welcome the proposal that private suppliers in the retail market will not be subject to price regulation. That is the correct principle. It should apply to every supplier, including Eskom and municipalities.
Honouring contracts. We support honouring legacy contracts. Contractual certainty is essential to investment. But the cost of legacy contracts procured by the State should be borne transparently by the State, not loaded onto competitive market prices.
Contestability and the Case Against Price Control
Contestable markets. William Baumol, John Panzar and Robert Willig showed that markets with free entry and exit are disciplined by potential competition, even where there are few actual suppliers or only one. Any supplier that charges more than its costs justify invites entry that takes its customers. Free entry is the regulator.
Monopoly properly understood. As our Review explains, a sole supplier is a harmful monopoly only if entry is prohibited. The only filling station in a small town is not a monopoly in the sense that matters, because its market is contestable. A sole supplier facing free entry may even behave more competitively than one facing existing rivals, because it stands to lose not a share of the market but all of it.
Consumer sovereignty. The South African economist William Hutt coined the term "consumer sovereignty" for the reality that, in open markets, consumers rule: they hire and fire the largest firms every day by choosing between them. In a contestable market, "dominance" belongs to consumers.
South African evidence. Eskom's recent turnaround is at least partly attributable to the threat of competition. The surge in rooftop and embedded generation after licensing thresholds were lifted shows that customers will bypass any supplier whose price or reliability disappoints. That is contestability working already.
Why price control harms. Where entry is free, price control adds nothing to competitive discipline except cost and error. If prices are fixed above market-clearing levels there are surpluses; if below, shortages. Administered prices discourage investment by substituting regulatory discretion for commercial certainty, invite lobbying and capture, and penalise the entrants and self-generators who discipline incumbents. Friedrich Hayek showed why: the knowledge on which prices depend is dispersed among millions of people and cannot be assembled by any regulator. Prices discover it; regulators can only guess at it.
Captive customers. The Paper keeps "all residential households and smaller commercial entities" captive to their distributor's retail arm, with choice limited during the transition to users above a threshold such as 1 MW. Contestability would be served instead by allowing every customer to choose a supplier as soon as metering and settlement allow, with the incumbent retailer as supplier of last resort.
Asymmetric regulation is the worst kind. The Paper proposes that Eskom's and municipalities' retail prices remain regulated while private suppliers' are not. Regulating some competitors' prices but not others' does not create a level playing field; it tilts it. Regulated suppliers cannot respond to competitors' offers, cannot price to retain customers and cannot innovate without approval. Their customers are the ones least able to switch. The correct remedy is not to extend price control to private suppliers but to remove it from Eskom and municipalities in every activity in which entry is free.
The Shackled Runner: Why Market Liberation Requires Eskom Liberation
Five burdens. Our Review identifies five unwarranted burdens that prevent Eskom from competing on equal terms: municipal debt; NERSA price control; non-business obligations under the PFMA; sub-economic REIPPPP liabilities; and social and welfare obligations. None of them is imposed on Eskom's competitors.
Municipal debt. Eskom is owed very large sums by defaulting municipalities. Private suppliers can decline to supply customers who do not pay; Eskom, in practice, cannot. No competitor would accept that condition. The arrears are a fiscal and constitutional problem for national and provincial government (including under section 139 of the Constitution), not a cost Eskom should carry into a competitive market.
Price control. As set out above, Eskom cannot compete if its prices are set by a regulator while its rivals set their own.
Social obligations. Eskom's duty, and its directors' fiduciary duty, is to supply electricity, not welfare. Subsidised tariffs for poor households should be funded openly from the Budget, not hidden in Eskom's tariffs and charged to its other customers, who will increasingly take their business elsewhere.
Legacy liabilities. Sub-economic legacy contracts were procured by the State. Novating them to the Central Purchasing Agency is sensible, but their excess cost should be met transparently and for a limited period, not embedded in market prices where it penalises competition.
Political interference. Our Review documents how Eskom was repeatedly subjected to political interference contrary to what its management and Board might have preferred — most consequentially in 2001, when it was barred from building new generation capacity. Had there been no such interference, and had Eskom been free to invest, there would probably not have been an era of load-shedding. The lesson is to free Eskom, not to direct it more.
Socio-economic directives. Footnote 2 of the Paper states that Eskom Generation, as a State-owned enterprise, "will align its operations with Government's broader policy objectives", which "may include supplementary socio-economic objectives (e.g. industrialisation and employment creation)". No private competitor carries such obligations. A generator required to pursue objectives other than commercial ones cannot compete on equal terms — and, as we explain below, its directors cannot lawfully be required to prefer those objectives to the company's interests.
Regulating one competitor's bids. The Paper contemplates that Eskom Generation "may still need to be regulated to limit its ability to exercise market power", for example by NERSA regulating its bids into the market (footnote 6), and that "additional measures beyond regulation" may be considered. Regulating one generator's bids converts a market price into a regulated price under another name. Market power is better addressed by free entry, imports, self-generation and competition law — and, if Eskom's Board judges it commercially sensible, by the sale of plant on commercial terms.
Vesting contracts. Vesting contracts are to "set wholesale market prices for generators and load during the initial stages of market operation". They should be short, declining and sunset-dated, or the transition will become the destination.
An incumbent's advantages are a benefit. Should Eskom's efficiency and its accumulated, depreciated plant allow it to price low enough to make some entry uneconomic, that is a benefit to consumers and the country. New entrants everywhere face the advantages of established operators. Policy should neither handicap the incumbent to make room for entrants nor protect it from them.
The Legality of Government Interference with Eskom
Who may decide
The central question. The issue facing government is not only what should be decided about Eskom's transmission assets, its prices and its business, but who may decide, and within what limits. On the law as we understand it, many of those decisions belong to Eskom's Board, not to the Department, the Presidency or Cabinet. We set out the principal considerations below. They merit a formal legal opinion before any irreversible step is taken.
Eskom is a company, governed by company law
Eskom's status. The Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001 converted Eskom into a public company with effect from 2002. It is now a State-owned company (SOC Ltd) subject to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, with the modifications applicable to State-owned companies (section 9). It is a separate legal person with its own assets, creditors and obligations.
The Board manages. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act provides that the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board. The Act is unambiguous about the respective roles of directors and shareholders.
The shareholder may not manage. The State, represented by the shareholder Minister, may elect and remove directors (section 71), adopt special resolutions where the Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation so provide (section 65), and must approve, by special resolution, any disposal of all or the greater part of the company's assets or undertaking (sections 112 and 115). It may not manage the company or instruct its directors to act contrary to the company's interests. If dissatisfied, its remedy is to replace the Board.
Only the shareholder Minister acts for the shareholder. No one else may act in that capacity, not even the President. A policy announcement — for example in the State of the Nation Address — is a statement of policy, not a shareholder decision. Section 101(1) of the Constitution requires a decision by the President to be in writing if it is taken in terms of legislation or has legal consequences.
Directors' duties
Companies Act, section 76(3). A director must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director in good faith and for a proper purpose, in the best interests of the company, and with the degree of care, skill and diligence reasonably expected of a person in that position.
PFMA, sections 49 to 51. Eskom is a major public entity listed in Schedule 2 to the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. Its Board, as accounting authority, must exercise the utmost care to ensure reasonable protection of the entity's assets, act with fidelity, honesty and integrity in its best interests, and seek to prevent any prejudice to the financial interests of the State (section 50(1)). It is responsible for the management, including the safeguarding, of its assets (section 51(1)(c)). A wilful or grossly negligent failure to comply with section 50 is a criminal offence (section 86(2)).
Governance codes. Eskom applies the King Code of Governance Principles, which treats the board as the focal point of governance and requires ethical and effective leadership in the organisation's legitimate interests.
The consequence. Eskom's directors may not act at the behest of external parties contrary to these obligations. Were they to implement political or executive policies inconsistent with Eskom's interests as they honestly see them, they could be acting unlawfully — and, if called upon to do so, might be obliged in law to resist, including by legal proceedings. Government should be clear that it does not want Eskom's directors to breach their fiduciary duties.
Transfer of transmission ownership
What the ERAA provides. The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 38 of 2024 inserted sections 34A and 34B into the Electricity Regulation Act, providing for the establishment of the Transmission System Operator SOC Ltd and for its duties, including non-discriminatory access to the transmission system. In our reading, the Act does not expressly provide for the transfer of ownership of Eskom's transmission assets to the TSO or to any other entity.
Restrictive interpretation. Legislation that interferes with existing rights is interpreted restrictively, so as to impose the minimum interference and otherwise leave the existing position untouched. And under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the Act provides for the TSO's functions but is silent on the alienation of assets, it may be argued that alienation is not mandated. On that reading a transfer effected without proper authority might be irregular.
The default position. In the absence of a lawful decision to the contrary, ownership of the transmission assets remains with Eskom. Operational independence of the system operator, open access and transparency — which the ERAA does require — can be achieved without divestiture.
Disposal requires approval and value. A disposal of a significant asset requires the approvals in sections 112 and 115 of the Companies Act and section 54(2)(d) of the PFMA. Under section 76(3) of the Companies Act and section 50(1) of the PFMA, Eskom's directors could not lawfully agree to give away a major asset without value. It may be said that the State need not pay itself. But Eskom is a separate legal entity whose creditors — many of them private bondholders and development banks — lent against its assets and cash flows. Removing assets without compensation could breach lending covenants, trigger cross-default on a large share of Eskom's debt, and lead to a qualified audit opinion and a rating downgrade. Eskom must be compensated for the sake of its creditors and its solvency.
Constitutional considerations
Property. Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation. Section 8(4) extends the Bill of Rights to juristic persons to the extent required by the nature of the right and of the juristic person (First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)). Whether a State-owned company may invoke section 25 against the State is unsettled, but the question should not be assumed away. Expropriation is permitted only in terms of a law of general application, for a public purpose or in the public interest, and subject to just and equitable compensation (section 25(2) and (3), read with the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024).
Just administrative action. Decisions affecting Eskom's assets and rights must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair (section 33 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000).
Efficient use of resources. Public administration, including public enterprises, must promote the efficient, economic and effective use of resources (section 195(1)(b) and (2)(c)). Stripping an asset from the entity best placed to use it, at the risk of its solvency, is difficult to reconcile with that principle.
Public participation. Public participation in the making of policy and law is a constitutional imperative. The Paper invites comment, yet reports indicate that Government regards the decision to separate the NTCSA from Eskom as final. Consultation on a decision already taken is not genuine consultation. If the Department wishes the process to withstand scrutiny, it should state that public comment on the TSO's ownership will be considered with an open mind.
Price control and political direction
Price control as interference. NERSA's power to set Eskom's tariffs (Electricity Regulation Act, sections 4 and 15) is lawful. But extending regulated pricing to Eskom's competitive activities in a liberalised market, while leaving its competitors free, places Eskom's Board in an impossible position: its fiduciary duty is to maximise the value of Eskom's assets and business, which it cannot do if its prices are set by others and its rivals' are not. Market liberalisation without Eskom liberalisation is not only unfair; it is arguably unlawful in its effect on Eskom and its creditors.
The socio-economic footnote. The statement that Eskom Generation "will align its operations with Government's broader policy objectives" (footnote 2) is precisely the kind of direction that the Companies Act and the PFMA do not permit, unless it is imposed by law of general application and funded. Eskom's directors must act in Eskom's best interests; they may not subordinate those interests to the shareholder's policy preferences.
Directions without authority. Where the State wishes Eskom to pursue non-commercial objectives — supplying non-paying municipalities, subsidising particular customers, or disposing of assets — it should do so through law of general application and with funding, not through informal direction of the Board. That is required not only by good governance but by the Companies Act and the PFMA.
Specific Comments on the Position Paper
Proposal | Concern | Recommendation |
Phased market opening (soft launch within the Eskom group in 2026; others from 2027) | Delays competition and entrenches the incumbent's transitional arrangements. | Open the wholesale market to all licensed and registered participants from launch. Allow bilateral trading meanwhile without restriction. |
Voluntary central trading platform and bilateral contracts | Correct in principle. | Retain. Make clear that no participant may be compelled to trade through the platform or a single buyer. |
Capacity market | A centrally designed capacity market substitutes administrative judgement about future needs for the decisions of investors and users; it tends to over-procure, is costly, and is prone to lobbying. | Rely on energy prices, bilateral contracts, hedging and voluntary reserve procurement by the system operator. If a capacity mechanism is ever considered, require proof of market failure first. |
Retail price regulation for Eskom and municipalities only | Asymmetric regulation handicaps the regulated suppliers and their customers. | Free retail prices for all suppliers wherever entry is free; regulate only non-contestable network charges, preferably by monitoring and review after the event. |
NTCSA "converted into an independent entity within five years"; further unbundling of Eskom Generation and Distribution | Legally doubtful; risks Eskom's solvency and creditors; not required for operational independence; reportedly regarded as final. | Secure the TSO's operational independence, open access and transparency; leave asset ownership to Eskom's Board; if any transfer is pursued, use clear statutory authority, the required approvals and fair value. |
Collaboration with independent transmission providers | Welcome. | Allow independent, private and merchant transmission lines to be built and owned freely, connecting to the national grid on published terms. |
Legacy contracts novated to the Central Purchasing Agency | Sensible, but risks recreating a single buyer; excess costs may be embedded in market prices. | Limit the CPA to existing legacy contracts with a sunset date; fund excess costs transparently and for a limited period, or from the fiscus. |
Further unbundling of Eskom Distribution and Generation | Structural separation is a business decision with large financial consequences. | Leave the structure of the Eskom group to its Board, subject to competition law and open access. |
Regulation of Eskom Generation's bids and "additional measures beyond regulation" (footnote 6) | Converts market prices into regulated prices for the largest supplier. | Rely on free entry, imports, self-generation and competition law; leave any sale of plant to Eskom's Board. |
Eskom Generation to pursue "supplementary socio-economic objectives" (footnote 2) | Unequal treatment of competitors; inconsistent with directors' duties. | Delete; impose any public-service obligation by law, on all suppliers alike, with funding. |
Vesting contracts setting wholesale prices during transition | Administered prices may become permanent. | Make them short, declining and sunset-dated. |
Captive residential and small-business customers; retail choice only above a threshold (e.g. 1 MW) | Denies most customers the benefits of competition. | Phase in retail choice for all customers as metering allows, with a supplier of last resort. |
Network charges including cross-subsidies that cannot be avoided by choice of retailer | Hides subsidies in network tariffs and penalises entrants. | Network charges for network costs only; subsidies funded from the Budget. |
B-BBEE and localisation requirements to govern "all commercial aspects" of the market | Raises costs and deters investment; inconsistent with the Paper's own commitment to efficiency and competitiveness. | Confine such requirements to State procurement; leave private market participation to commercial terms. |
Ministerial determinations for new capacity | Central procurement crowds out private investment and repeats the legacy-contract problem. | Use only on demonstrated market failure, procure competitively and fund transparently. |
Municipal participation and prudential requirements | Unresolved: who bears the risk of defaulting municipalities. | Allow customers in defaulting municipalities to buy directly from suppliers of their choice; resolve municipal arrears as a fiscal matter, not by burdening Eskom. |
The Case Against Government Intervention
Knowledge. No authority can know enough to plan an electricity system of millions of prosumers, variable renewables, storage and regional trade. Markets coordinate that knowledge through prices; planners cannot.
Incentives. Those who invest their own capital bear the cost of their mistakes; those who plan with others' money do not. South Africa's experience of centrally planned capacity — surplus in the 1980s, shortage in the 2000s — illustrates the point.
Capture. Where government decides who may sell, at what price and with whose assets, effort shifts from serving customers to influencing decision-makers. George Stigler showed that regulation tends to be acquired by, and operated for the benefit of, the interests it regulates.
Intervention begets intervention. Ludwig von Mises observed that each intervention creates problems that seem to call for further intervention. Price control on Eskom creates bypass; bypass erodes Eskom's revenue; lost revenue is met with levies on those who bypass. The way out is to remove the first intervention.
Certainty and the rule of law. Investors need stable general rules, not discretionary decisions that change with each policy cycle. Respect for corporate governance and property rights — including the State's respect for the autonomy of its own companies — is itself a signal to investors that the rules will be kept.
Answering the objections. Concerns about market power are best met by free entry, open access and competition law, applied with proper regard to contestability; concerns about poor households by targeted subsidies funded from the Budget; concerns about security of supply by voluntary contracts for firm supply and reserves; and concerns about legacy costs by transparent, time-limited recovery or fiscal funding. None requires the State to set prices in contestable activities or to direct Eskom's Board.
Conclusion
The Position Paper fires the starting gun for a competitive electricity market. That is to be welcomed. But a race in which the largest runner is shackled — its prices controlled, its assets removed, its Board directed and its balance sheet burdened with others' debts — is not a fair race and will not produce the investment, reliability and lower prices the Paper seeks. Unshackle the runner. Open the market to all from the start; free every supplier's prices where entry is free; leave Eskom's assets and structure to its Board, acting lawfully in Eskom's interests; and fund social goals openly. Then let the race be run.
We thank the Department for the opportunity to comment and would be pleased to assist further.
Sources
Baumol, W.J., "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure", American Economic Review 72(1), 1982, pp. 1–15.
Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C. and Willig, R.D., Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.
Companies Act 71 of 2008, sections 9, 15, 65, 66, 71, 76, 112 and 115.
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, sections 8(4), 25, 33, 101(1), 139 and 195.
Department of Electricity and Energy, Electricity Sector Market Transformation Position Paper, 2026, Government Notice No. 7841, Government Gazette No. 55226, 21 August 2026.
Department of Electricity and Energy, Government Notice No. 7948, Government Gazette No. 55436, 22 September 2026 (extension of comment period).
Department of Electricity and Energy, Revised Electricity Pricing Policy, 2026, Government Notice No. 7852, Government Gazette No. 55257, 28 August 2026.
Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006, sections 4, 15, 34A and 34B (as inserted by the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 38 of 2024).
Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001.
Expropriation Act 13 of 2024.
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC).
Hayek, F.A., "The Use of Knowledge in Society", American Economic Review 35(4), 1945, pp. 519–530.
Hutt, W.H., Economists and the Public: A Study of Competition and Opinion, Jonathan Cape, 1936.
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2016.
Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation, Electricity Policy Review, October 2026.
Mises, L. von, Middle-of-the-Road Policy Leads to Socialism, 1950 (reprinted in Planning for Freedom, Libertarian Press, 1952).
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, sections 49 to 51, 54(2)(d), 86(2) and Schedule 2.
Stigler, G.J., "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 1971, pp. 3–21.
ENDS
The Freedom Foundation & Izwe Lami is a policy think tank which researches and analyses government policy and positions in the national interest. It has no political affiliations or allegiances.
The energy sector is perhaps the most critical South African sector as it supports and affects every individual’s life and determines the economic prospects of the country for than any other single factor.
We have brought together several experts who provide valuable insight to energy market transformation in addition to making our internal submission from CEO Leon Louw.
Comments