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Craig Morkel - Electricity Sector Market Transformation Submission
Response to the Department of Electricity and Energy Position Paper
Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation (NPC)27 October 2026 | Public Consultation Submission
Core Position
Open electricity markets to willing buyers and sellers through freedom of entry, honest prices and enforceable access to networks. Sequence implementation carefully, preserve valid rights and system security, and keep political direction out of individual commercial and regulatory decisions. Quantify inherited and social obligations and address their funding transparently through the Budget, rather than obscuring them in competitive electricity prices.
Recipient and Scope
Director-General, Department of Electricity and Energy, for the attention of Ms Vusani Ramuntshi. Government Notice 7841, Government Gazette 55226, 21 August 2026. Consultation deadline: 28 October 2026. [1–2]
This submission concerns electricity market transformation. Pricing is addressed where it affects competition, entry, transition liabilities and delivered bills; it is not a separate submission on the Revised Electricity Pricing Policy. The analysis is qualitative and does not quantify national tariff savings or certify operational market readiness.
1 Background and Context
The Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation (NPC) advances liberty, free enterprise and property rights. Electricity reform should enable South Africans to produce, trade and choose supply while holding monopoly networks accountable. [3]
The Position Paper proposes moving beyond an integrated utility. The Foundation supports competitive exchange and impartial system operation, but entry barriers, inherited liabilities and discretionary intervention may undermine workable rules and affordable bills.
The assessment covers generation, networks, system and market operation, trading, retail and municipalities. It tests reliability, delivered costs, environmental performance and economic participation without endorsing open-ended subsidies or technology preferences. Each measure needs a legal basis, accountable institution, cost bearer and measurable outcome.
Figure 1. Neutral Access from Generator to Customer (R1–R3).
This schematic depicts policy responsibilities, not an implemented South African market structure.
2 Introduction and Summary
Support competition; amend institutional and implementation arrangements; oppose distortions protecting particular producers or transferring unquantified liabilities to consumers. Contracting freedom requires usable grid access, reliable settlement and progressive household and small-business choice. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) should regulate monopoly services and applicable rules within its mandate, not direct competitive prices.
The Foundation opposes vesting contracts that constrain Eskom prices. It favours transparent treatment of inherited obligations, independent market surveillance, neutral access and voluntary contracts. Should vesting nevertheless proceed, test and disclose its funding, cost classification and effect on entry; scrutiny does not signify endorsement.
Resolve municipal debt through funded recovery before institutional distribution separation. Retain economically viable coal generation subject to lawful environmental and operating requirements. Allocate incremental integration costs by causation, and efficient shared costs transparently without double recovery.
Structure of the Submission
Section 3 sets out proposed amendments; Section 4 identifies positive features; Section 5 addresses competition and constitutional principles; and Section 6 presents the recommendations and implementation register. Endnotes identify public sources.
3 Specific Aspects of the Position Paper
3.1 Institutional Independence and Grid Ownership
AMEND — Make neutrality enforceable through separate network, system, market and commercial decision rights, accounts, information barriers and independent review. The Central Purchasing Agency (CPA) should be separate or effectively ring-fenced from system and market administration, with interim safeguards and a dated independence plan. [1,4]
The Department of Electricity and Energy (DEE) should map responsible legal entities; NERSA should apply regulatory safeguards; the National Transmission Company South Africa (NTCSA) and network service providers should demonstrate compliance. Competition authorities should address misconduct within their powers. Replace generic “Government” commitments with the accountable decision-maker, instrument and review route.
Distinguish asset ownership from system operation and market administration. Disclose current and proposed owners, transfers, lender and contractual consents, encumbrances, legally required compensation and timing. Functional independence does not complete asset transfers; due process must protect existing rights.
Governance should disclose competency criteria, conflicts, appointment procedures and independent scrutiny. Policy cannot reassign statutory powers without separately identified, consulted legislative change.
Equal Access to Preparation and Trials
The Position Paper envisages a 2026 soft launch and entry beyond Eskom from 2027. [1] Avoid unequal trial access: NTCSA’s market operator should provide qualified prospective participants comparable sandbox windows, interfaces, training and test data. Publish risk-based security criteria and reasons for exclusion.
Report trial participation and material exceptions. An incumbent-only trial does not establish wider readiness. Provide independent escalation for discriminatory access while protecting emergency system-security decisions, subject to subsequent review.
3.2 Network Access and Connection Costs
AMEND — Enforce usable network access. The Grid Capacity Allocation Rules (GCAR) were gazetted on 24 December 2025. Eskom’s September 2026 readiness assessment guidance was hosted in its October upload directory. Distinguish gazetted rules from guidance, disclosing versions, effective dates and changes without duplicating processes. [5]
Separate Grid Code technical connection requirements, quotations and agreements from administrative service standards and wheeling treatment. Network providers should publish applications, decision times, refusal reasons, dependencies and escalation paths. Metering, accounting and imbalance settlement remain governed by their respective instruments.
Generators should bear efficient, attributable connection costs. Quotes must separate dedicated assets, shared reinforcement and wider network works, explaining beneficiary contributions, contestability and refunds. Access charges must not recover unrelated historic liabilities or protect incumbent sales.
Publish capacity constraints, queues and consistent reservation and release milestones without exposing confidential data. Connection offers must specify works, dates, curtailment and delay consequences. Forecasts require probabilities and dependencies; indicative maps are not binding offers.
Remove unnecessary licensing and wheeling barriers through lawful instruments. Where licences or registration remain mandatory, amend the applicable law rather than imply automatic abolition. Publish proportionate fees, evidence requirements and processing times.
Requested Wording
Network service providers shall administer access under consistent, published criteria and the applicable codes and allocation rules. Decisions and charges shall identify their reasons, cost basis and review route. Project-specific connection costs shall fall on the connecting party, with efficient shared reinforcement allocated transparently among beneficiaries. No access condition shall be used solely to protect incumbent retail revenue.
3.3 Contracts, Customer Choice and Prosumers
SUPPORT AND AMEND — Preserve voluntary bilateral contracts as buyer and seller hedges already recognised in the Position Paper. [1] Power purchase agreements may stabilise costs but do not displace metering, balancing, network constraints or lawful system charges.
Publish separate wholesale eligibility and retail-choice schedules. Qualified retail customers need not trade directly. An illustrative threshold must not permanently exclude smaller businesses or households; justify restrictions and publish review dates and removal criteria.
Voluntary switching needs published notices, meter reads, final settlement, historic-debt treatment and consent. Preserve lawful recovery without letting disputed bills veto switching indefinitely. Apply equivalent rules to equivalent risks regardless of ownership.
Prosumers, Storage and Aggregation
Figure 2. Dispatchability and Full-System Cost Pathways (R3, R7).
Mashele and Modisane concepts illustrate analytical tests; their frameworks are not asserted to be adopted market rules.
Enable rooftop generation, batteries and controllable demand to provide export energy, flexibility and eligible ancillary services directly or through aggregators. Verify connection capacity, consent, limits and dependable performance: installed capacity does not imply dispatchability.
NERSA and relevant operators should specify export metering, settlement intervals, necessary telemetry, demand-response baselines, balance responsibility and aggregator qualification. Prevent double payment or double sale of capacity. Distribution providers should publish hosting constraints and coordinate dispatch limits.
Pay for verified service value, reflecting location and timing, not presumed entitlement to retail tariffs. Network charges should recover efficient retained network services rather than penalise customers for reducing incumbent energy sales.
Municipal Flexibility and the GreenCape Pilot
GreenCape’s October 2026 Virtual Power Plant Regulatory Sandbox Pilot, with Integrate to Zero and Global Grids Catalyst and in collaboration with the City of Cape Town, tests distributed flexibility on municipal networks. Peak-to-off-peak shifting raises practical questions about dispatch, consent, metering, baselines, performance payments and distribution constraints. [6]
Use pilot evidence to inform technology-neutral aggregation rules while separating municipal services from national obligations. Sandbox participation implies neither statutory exemption nor future eligibility. Publish measured system value, customer benefit, costs, funding and unresolved regulatory barriers.
Require plain-language offers disclosing energy, network, pass-through and exit charges, term and spot or imbalance exposure. Compare total bills using common profiles; preserve optional bundled fixed-price products.
Figure 3. Full Delivered Bill versus Public Obligations (R6, R9).
Index units are synthetic. Budget treatment is a Foundation policy proposal, not an appropriation or guarantee.
3.4 Settlement and Contracts for Difference
AMEND — Test the full meter-to-payment chain before live financial exposure: registration, meters, schedules, dispatch, reconciliation, invoices, collateral and bank payments. Include data gaps, price corrections, cyber disruption, default and recovery; publish pass criteria and exceptions.
Physical delivery, commercial commitments and settlement differ. Bilateral contracts reserve no dedicated physical grid flow. Balance responsibility covers schedule deviations; financial hedges cover prices. Neither removes connection, volume, counterparty or delivery risks.
Match prudential rules to exposure: collateral, security, margin calls, suspension and default waterfalls. Limit and disclose mutualised losses. Allow disputes while undisputed sums are paid; specify substitute meter data and settlement finality.
Correct the Payment Direction and Identify the Payer
For a conventional two-way Contract for Difference (CfD), the settlement amount to the generator is the strike price less the reference market price, multiplied by the eligible contract volume. When the reference price is below the strike, the counterparty pays the generator; when it is above the strike, the generator pays the counterparty, subject to the contract’s terms. Annex 1 of the Position Paper repeats “below” for both directions and should be corrected. [1, Annex 1]
Market prices do not provide funding. For proposed Eskom or legacy independent power producer arrangements, the CPA and contracting parties should disclose reference price, volume, strike, indexation, netting, payments, collateral, liquidity provider and ultimate loss bearer. Do not presume every legacy contract is a two-way CfD.
Stress-test sustained low prices, volume reductions, plant failure and default. Identify liquidity and authorised funding before novation or live settlement. Budget support for inherited and social obligations is the Foundation’s proposal, not an approved appropriation or guarantee. Existing payment obligations remain enforceable.
Figure 4. Meter-to-Bank and Contract Settlement (R4).
Illustrative prices and volumes represent no actual vesting, legacy or independent power producer contract.
3.5 Vesting, Legacy Liabilities and Market Power
OPPOSE AND PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE — The Foundation does not endorse vesting contracts to constrain Eskom prices. Competitive energy prices should emerge from voluntary contracting and transparent trading, supported by impartial networks and effective enforcement against abuse. Separate inherited obligations from the cost of future competitive supply.
Annex 1 proposes vesting with agreed fixed-cost and market-linked energy components. [1] Moving fuel or avoidable costs into guaranteed fixed payments may conceal recovery and weaken entry despite lower visible wholesale prices. Publish cost classifications and test this risk.
If adopted despite objection, disclose plants, volumes, cost components, security, beneficiaries, review and exit terms. Test dispatch incentives, liquidity, entry and delivered bills under demand and fuel-price sensitivities. Prevent double recovery across energy, fixed, capacity and ancillary-service payments. These are fallback safeguards, not endorsement.
Do not present illustrative declining recovery as an agreed timetable. Publish the methodology and phase-out schedule. Coal fuel costs and renewable bid tariffs alone omit capital, timing, balancing, availability and network costs.
Honour Rights and Quantify the Inherited Burden
Independently assess legacy contracts, debt, stranded assets, overruns and public-policy duties. Distinguish valid contractual liabilities from unproven lost-profit claims or inefficient future costs. Test remaining asset value, prior recovery, prudence and alternatives.
The Foundation proposes transparent Budget treatment of justified legacy and social obligations, with beneficiaries, amounts, funding authority and duration disclosed. Any support to industrial users or households should be explicit and reviewable, rather than hidden in competitive prices. This is a funding proposal, not a claim that expenditure has been approved.
Request deletion of Position Paper footnote 2 on supplementary socio-economic duties for Eskom Generation. Equal market rules are undermined by unspecified additional duties or preferential compensation. If a public service is required, define and fund it separately. Novation of existing contracts must preserve required consents, credit support, enforceable rights and lender protections.
3.6 Reliability and Technology Neutrality
AMEND — Energy trading alone cannot secure reliability. The system operator should publish location-specific requirements for frequency response, reserves, voltage and reactive-power support, inertia or validated equivalents, black start and other services. NERSA oversees applicable standards and recovery within its mandate. [4]
Specify service location, speed, duration, availability, telemetry, testing and penalties. Separate mandatory connection duties from procured services. Use competition where possible; justify sole-provider arrangements. Publish volumes, expenditure and performance.
Allow generation, storage, demand response and aggregators to compete for equivalent verified services. Supplying energy does not prove ancillary-service capability; avoid paying twice for one obligation.
Before broad capacity payments, demonstrate the adequacy need and assess targeted services, demand response, improved price signals and grid investment. Test dependable capacity under stress against storage duration, weather, fuel, maintenance and network availability.
Costs Should Follow Causation
Allocate incremental balancing, connection and integration costs by causation, and efficient shared costs transparently. Credit beneficial flexibility; avoid blanket technology penalties or indiscriminate socialisation. Publish measurement and disputes methods before investment.
Retain economically viable, lawful coal capacity without preferential early retirement. Assess renewables, storage, gas and alternatives on the same whole-system basis. Gas projects must disclose fuel, transport, currency and take-or-pay risks; no automatic preference or indefinite guarantees.
For transmission expansion, disclose land, funding, construction, operation, delays, congestion and redispatch costs. Consult on changes to locational signals. Cheap wholesale electricity is immaterial without deliverable networks.
3.7 Municipal Debt and Distribution Transition
AMEND — Municipal electricity arrears require explicit fiscal and institutional resolution. National Treasury, municipalities, Eskom and competent local-government authorities should reconcile liabilities and lawful treatment; DEE coordinates sector interfaces without assuming municipal powers.
Publish opening debts, disputes, current-payment requirements, restructuring terms, enforcement and funded recovery. Separate historic municipal debts from new market settlement; entrants must not automatically guarantee unrelated arrears.
The Foundation opposes institutional distribution separation until debt has a credible, funded resolution. Start now with auditable records, accurate bills, maintenance and current-payment controls, without prematurely changing legal or asset structures. Continue lawful access and service improvements.
Later separation needs business cases, lawful allocation of assets and liabilities, lender treatment, municipal approvals and tested settlement. Do not strand debt on captive users. Connected customers pay for efficient network services, not lost incumbent sales.
Procurement and Payment Discipline
Identify lawful municipal procurement and delegation changes, including contract tenor and price-risk management, without blanket exemptions from public finance controls. Verify demand, billing, authority, financial cover and default responses before participation.
Report payments, billing errors, maintenance, outages and disputes. Preserve lawful recovery and safety while protecting paying customers against unmanaged default. Retailer-of-last-resort arrangements cannot resolve municipal debts.
3.8 Final Bills and Symmetrical Retail Rules
AMEND — Reconcile wholesale prices with final bills: networks, balancing, ancillary services, applicable capacity, retail costs, taxes and lawful transition charges. Show gross charges and offsets separately.
Lower wholesale prices can accompany higher retail bills. Before rule changes, compare households, small businesses, industry and self-generators using published demand profiles, fixed and variable charges and distributional sensitivities. Avoid presenting one average as universal.
NERSA should test regulated-charge efficiency, legality, overlap and fixed-charge changes. Generator fixed costs do not automatically justify fixed retail charges; capital-intensive projects may recover costs through contracts or market revenue, depending on design.
Correct or remove the Position Paper’s inference that fixed-cost technologies inherently make unit-output prices less important and fixed retail charges more important. [1, Guiding principles] Justify network fixed charges by services, efficient allocation and affordability.
Choice and Continuity
OPPOSE asymmetric retail rules that shield incumbents or burden equivalent entrant activities. Regulate competitive supply differently from monopoly networks, applying proportionate disclosure, consent, switching and default safeguards without permanently barring choice.
Before each segment opens, fund retailer-of-last-resort procedures for transfers, credit balances, emergency prices and new contracts. Separate trader default from household disconnection; provide accessible complaints and bill correction, including offline assistance.
Social policy should be considered explicitly through authorised fiscal instruments, rather than imposed as an undefined obligation on generators or competing retailers. This submission proposes neither an expansion of free-basic-energy programmes nor the earlier household LPG measure. Existing legal entitlements are not purported to be repealed by this submission.
4 Positive Features
SUPPORT — The Position Paper recognises bilateral contracts, competitive trading, impartial operation and non-discriminatory access, alongside necessary codes, regulatory changes, trials and institutional reform. These are sound foundations for reaching willing customers. [1]
The Foundation supports consultation and a staged transition testing settlement and security before live exposure. Convert intentions into accountable owners, enforceable access, transparent prices and a path beyond large customers.
5 Freedom, Competition and Constitutional Principles
5.1 Independence Must Be Demonstrated
Company names or ring-fenced accounts alone do not ensure neutrality. Publish decision rights, asset ownership, conflicts and performance. Regulatory decisions must be reasoned, reviewable and politically independent.
5.2 Choice and Market Distortion
Preserve voluntary bilateral contracts and progressive retail choice. Oppose indefinite barriers, compulsory central purchasing of contestable energy, asymmetric obligations and undisclosed support. Enforce competition law against proven abuse, not through presumed benefits of administered prices.
5.3 Advisory Bodies and Accountability
Advisory bodies need defined remits, evidence access, published advice and reasoned institutional responses. Consultation informs accountable decisions without transferring statutory authority or creating vetoes.
5.4 Fiscal Clarity and Lawful Implementation
Publish liabilities, authorised funding and contingencies. Asset transfers, contract novation, municipal restructuring and charges require lawful process. Publish legal, regulatory and socio-economic impact assessments, alternatives and distributional effects. Remedy deficiencies before measures take effect; the Foundation makes no untested claim that the entire Position Paper is unconstitutional.
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
The Foundation requests these amendments and alternatives to secure freedom of entry and contract, neutral networks and honest prices. DEE should publish responses naming instruments and responsible authorities.
R1 AMEND — Enforce network and market neutrality; separate or ring-fence the CPA; clarify grid ownership and lawful transfers.
R2 AMEND — Implement usable access under applicable allocation rules; remove unnecessary barriers; make generators responsible for attributable connection costs.
R3 SUPPORT / AMEND — Preserve bilateral contracts; publish a route to wider retail choice, prosumer exports, storage and aggregation.
R4 AMEND — Test meter-to-payment settlement and default arrangements; specify CfD payment direction, liquidity and ultimate funding.
R5 OPPOSE / ALTERNATIVE — Do not use vesting to constrain Eskom prices; pursue neutral access, surveillance and transparent legacy treatment.
R6 AMEND — Honour valid contracts; quantify legacy and social obligations for transparent Budget treatment; delete Position Paper footnote 2.
R7 AMEND — Procure defined ancillary and reliability services; allocate incremental integration costs by causation; retain viable lawful coal.
R8 AMEND — Resolve municipal debt through a funded fiscal programme before institutional distribution separation.
R9 AMEND / OPPOSE — Show total bills and fixed-charge effects; oppose asymmetric retail rules; fund continuity arrangements.
R10 AMEND — Publish the complete Annex 2 responsibility and deadline register; offer equal trials and report results.
Respectfully submitted,Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation (NPC)Johannesburg, South Africa | 27 October 2026
6.1 Implementation Sequence and Deadlines
The Position Paper envisages a 2026 soft launch and phased entry beyond Eskom from 2027, without specifying April in that passage. [1] DEE should publish the approved baseline, completed work and delays. Calendar targets alone do not establish readiness.
These proposed commitments are not official deadlines. T is final-policy publication; DEE should publish calendar dates within 30 days of T. For completed tasks, provide instruments and acceptance evidence. No cohort should incur live exposure before its applicable prerequisites pass.
Figure 5. Proposed Transition and Safety Gates (R10).
Stage | Required outcome | Decision and timing |
1 Establish authority and fiscal baseline | Clarify ownership, independence, valid rights and responsibilities. Quantify legacy, social and municipal obligations and identify lawful funding. | DEE coordinates; Treasury and competent authorities act within their powers. Baseline by T+30 days. |
2 Enable neutral entry and trials | Publish access and eligibility pathways; remove unnecessary barriers; provide equal training and sandbox access; test settlement and funding. | NERSA, operators and participants. Instruments and trial plans by T+60 days; evidence by T+90 days or before live exposure. |
3 Open qualified participation | Demonstrate secure operations, funded settlement, default handling, surveillance and customer continuity for the admitted cohort. | Relevant competent approval bodies and operators. No live financial exposure before applicable tests pass. |
4 Expand and review | Review household and small-business choice; publish bills, entry, reliability and settlement outcomes. Institutional distribution separation follows funded debt resolution. | Quarterly after opening; first expansion review within six months. Publish recovery plans for missed dates. |
The proposed sequence is contingent on applicable statutory approvals, contractual consents and verified, cohort-specific readiness.
Annex 2 Coverage
The register covers every Annex 2 prerequisite. Functional owners remain subject to legal powers. Excluded cohort tasks require published reasons and later deadlines, not silent deletion.
6.2 Annex 2 Implementation Register
Prerequisite | Accountable lead | Proposed timing | Closure evidence |
A01 Market design | NTCSA market operator; DEE policy lead | T+60 days | Publish design, institutional interfaces and decision record. |
A02 Market codes | NTCSA proposes; NERSA approves | T+90; before live exposure | Applicable code approved and published; changes traced. |
A03 Regulatory framework | NERSA; DEE where legislation is needed | T+60 instrument map | Identify instruments, consultations and approval dates. |
A04 Eligibility legislation and approval | DEE and competent legislative authority; NERSA | T+60 schedule; before cohort entry | Publish lawful criteria and retail expansion review dates. |
A05 Transmission and distribution codes | Code bodies and operators; NERSA | T+90; before affected entry | Publish approved interfaces, obligations and dependencies. |
A06 Trading licences switching and last resort | NERSA; operators; qualified retailers | T+90; before customer entry | Proportionate qualification; tested switching and funded fallback. |
A07 Planning and procurement | System operator; DEE; NERSA within mandate | T+60 needs and procurement plan | Publish adequacy and ancillary-service needs, procurement and cost allocation. |
A08 Municipal regulatory changes | Treasury; local-government authorities; municipalities; DEE | T+60 gap and debt plan | Identify lawful procurement changes and funded debt resolution; no premature separation. |
A09 Proposed vesting contracts | DEE; NERSA; CPA and contracting parties | Decision by T+60; before exposure | Record Foundation opposition; publish alternative or full methodology, funding and safeguards if retained. |
A10 Stranded cost treatment | Treasury; NERSA; affected parties | T+60 register; funding before transfer | Independently verify obligations, prior recovery, rights and authorised funding. |
A11 Market training | Market operator; participant organisations | T+60 programme | Provide numerical cases, settlement examples and equal access. |
A12 IT tools and software | Market and system operators | T+90; before live exposure | Validate security, interfaces, recovery and reconciled data. |
A13 Platform training and testing | Market operator and all qualifying applicants | Before live entry; publish dates by T+30 | Comparable sandbox windows, support and qualification evidence. |
A14 Business processes and delegations | Eskom divisions and NTCSA boards | T+60; before live exposure | Authorised mandates, signing powers and audited segregation of functions. |
A15 NTCSA independence | DEE; relevant shareholder; NTCSA; NERSA | T+30 plan; interim safeguards before entry | Publish ownership and transfer route, information barriers and independent compliance evidence. |
A16 Eskom distribution and generation unbundling | Eskom; shareholder; Treasury; NERSA | T+60 plan; separation after prerequisites | Legal and fiscal assessment, debt treatment and neutral network arrangements; protect valid rights. |
A17 End-to-end system trials | Market operator; participants; independent assessor | Before live exposure | Pass meter-to-bank, default, cyber and recovery tests; close critical exceptions. |
T is final-policy publication. Timing is proposed, not an assertion of existing legal deadlines. DEE should publish a consolidated register; each named institution remains responsible only within its lawful powers.
Public Reporting and Missed Milestones
Figure 6. Proposed Implementation Windows and Interdependencies (R10; Not Official Deadlines).
The model assumes T is the as-yet-unspecified final-policy publication date. the South African Wholesale Electricity Market (SAWEM), NERSA and the Revised Electricity Pricing Policy (REPP) developments are shown as alignment tracks only.
Publish monthly updates before opening and quarterly outcomes afterwards, identifying owners, evidence, dependencies, exceptions and revised dates. Explain missed milestones with recovery plans. Readiness gates prevent unsafe exposure, not indefinite exclusion.
6.3 Consolidated Provision Response Matrix
This matrix links the Position Paper provisions to the Foundation’s requested treatment and the recommendations above. SUPPORT, AMEND, OPPOSE and ALTERNATIVE identify the requested policy positions.
Position Paper anchor | Disposition | Requested response and location |
Guiding principles and structure | AMEND • R1 | Neutral administration; clear grid ownership and lawful transfer. §3.1 |
Networks and access | AMEND • R2 | Apply GCAR and code requirements; transparent quotations, queues and project forecasts. §3.2 |
Bilateral and retail markets | SUPPORT / AMEND • R3 | Retain hedging and voluntary contracting; publish expansion and prosumer routes. §3.3 |
Short-term markets and settlement | AMEND • R4 | Test settlement and default; identify collateral and loss allocation. §3.4 |
Annex 1 CfD definition | AMEND • R4 | Correct payment direction; identify CPA liquidity, funding and stress cases. §3.4 |
Market power and vesting | OPPOSE / ALTERNATIVE • R5 | Replace price-constraining vesting with competition safeguards and transparent legacy treatment. §3.5 |
Legacy IPPs and stranded costs | AMEND • R6 | Preserve valid rights; verify costs and propose authorised Budget funding. §3.5 |
Generation footnote 2 | OPPOSE / ALTERNATIVE • R6 | Delete unspecified supplementary obligations; separately define and fund public services. §3.5 |
Longer-term markets and reliability | AMEND • R7 | Procure measurable ancillary services; allocate incremental costs by causation. §3.6 |
Municipal participation and distribution | AMEND • R8 | Fund debt resolution before institutional separation; strengthen current-payment controls. §3.7 |
Retail and fair cost allocation | AMEND / OPPOSE • R9 | Assess full bills; correct fixed-cost inference; oppose asymmetric retail rules. §3.8 |
Timeframes and Annex 2 | AMEND • R10 | Publish owners, dates, evidence and equal trials; report and remedy delay. §§6.1–6.2 |
Requested Departmental Response
Publish acceptance, amendment or rejection with reasons for each material recommendation. For deferred measures, identify the instrument, owner and consultation date. Test whether qualified sellers reach willing buyers through neutral networks and reliable settlement.
Endnotes
[1] Department of Electricity and Energy. Electricity Sector Market Transformation Position Paper, August 2026. Government Notice 7841, Government Gazette 55226, 21 August 2026. Relevant anchors: Guiding principles; Overall sectoral structure and footnote 2; wholesale and retail markets; Supporting sectoral stakeholders; Timeframes; Annexes 1 and 2. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202608/55226gon7841.pdf
[2] Department of Electricity and Energy. Extension of public comments on the Market Transformation Position Paper and Revised Electricity Pricing Policy to 28 October 2026. Notice 7948, Government Gazette 55436, 22 September 2026; departmental announcement, 23 September 2026. https://www.dee.gov.za/minister-ramokgopa-extends-public-comments-period-on-the-electricity-sector-market-tranformation-position-paper-and-revised-electricity-pricing-policy/
[3] Izwe Lami Freedom Foundation NPC. About the Foundation. Organisational identity and purpose; accessed 26 October 2026. https://www.freedomfoundation.co.za/about
[4] Republic of South Africa. Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 38 of 2024, Government Gazette 51100, 20 August 2024. Statutory context for market and system functions and ancillary services. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202408/51100electricityregamendmentact38of2024.pdf
[5] Grid Capacity Allocation Rules. Government Notice 6982, Government Gazette 53914, 24 December 2025. See information requirements, allocation process, queue procedures, compliance and disputes. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202512/53914gon6982.pdf Implementation context: Eskom Grid Access Unit, Readiness Assessment Criteria, 559-344047190, revision 04, dated 1 September 2026. An October hosting path does not establish the publication day or a new NERSA notice. Open Eskom guidance
[6] GreenCape. Call for virtual power plant pilot sandbox participation, 22 October 2026. See call pages 1–4 for scope, measurement and verification, customer consent, incentives, indicative implementation dates and contractual interfaces. The call describes a proposed pilot, not measured outcomes. Open GreenCape call and application details
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